Abstract. Our paper aims to investigate inference rules for Nelson's logics and to discuss possible ways to determine admissibility of inference rules in such logics. We will use the technique offered originally for intuitionistic logic and paraconsistent minimal Johannson's logic. However, the adaptation is not an easy and evident task since Nelson's logics do not enjoy replacement of equivalences rule. Therefore we consider and compare standard admissibility and weak admissibility. Our paper founds algorithms for recognizing weak admissibility and admissibility itself -for restricted cases, to show the problems arising in the course of study.
Introduction
In the area of non-classical logics, besides discussions concerning efficient axiomatizations, the question of applicability possible new inference rules, different from standard ones, was set up in 1950x by P.Lorenzen. In particular, he, it seems, first time formulated the concept of admissibility for inference rules in precise terms. The admissibility problem (to determine for any given rule if this rule is admissible for a given logic) was in focus of interest for many logicians. Active research in the area may be dated to Harvey Friedman problem [15] : if there is an algorithm for verification of admissibility in the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC (this problem was first solved by Rybakov in 1984, [29] ). Then the admissibility has been investigated from various viewpoints for many different logical systems related to non-classical propositional logics (cf. V. Rybakov [30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 34] , Rybakov, et al [2, 3] , R. Iemhoff [4, 5] , R. Iemhoff and G. Metcalfe [6] , E. Jerabek [8, 11, 9, 7] ). Algorithmic problem of recognizing admissibility, problem of descriptions bases for admissible rules, and many other related questions were considered. For example, only a necessary condition for admissibility of inference rules in the branching-time temporal logic T S4 was found in [36] , though for linear temporal logic LTL the problem was solved in full [34] . Complexity problem for admissibility in intuitionistic logic and some modal logics was first studied and re-solved in Jerabek [10] . A new approach to study admissible rules was offered by S. Ghilardi via unification technique. He in ( [12] , 1999) first found an algorithm writing out a complete set of unifiers for any unifiable in IPC formula, and this gives another solution for admissibility problem.
This our article continues the investigation of admissible rules in paraconsistent logics [25] , which was started in [24] . In that paper the problematic of admissibility and unification was addressed to minimal Johansson's logic J [16] and positive intuitionistic logic IPC + . The first of these logics has the negation weaker then the intuitionistic one, whereas the second logic simply lacks the negation connective. The most essential difficulties arising in the study of admissibility for such logics is connected with the impossibility to use the Gödel-Tarski translation. In case of intuitionistic logic, the problem of admissibility for inference rules with parameters was solved earlier by V. Rybakov in [31] , where the proof was essentially based on the Gödel-Tarski translation of intuitionistic logic into S4. In [24] , we presented the construction which does not appeal to modal language, and due to this reason modifications of this construction can be applied to a wide class of logics based on the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic. In [24] , we adopted this technique to solve the admissibility and unification problems for positive intuitionistic logic IPC + . In the present article we make the first effort to study the admissibility problem for extensions of Nelson's logic and give further applications of the construction developed in [24] .
To overcome the non-constructivity of intuitionistic negation D. Nelson [19] suggested the concept of constructible falsity, which assumes that the falsity of atomic statements is given explicitly, and the falsity of complex statements is reduced to the truth or falsity of its constituents via a constructive procedure. Subsequently, his system of constructive logic with strong negation, traditionally denoted by N3, was axiomatized by Vorob'ev [38, 39] and studied algebraically by Helena Rasiowa [26, 27] .
The concept of constructible falsity agrees well with that of paraconsistency. If the falsity of an atom p represented as ∼ p, the strong negation of p, is given explicitly, we may admit that both p and ∼ p are true. The paraconsistent Nelson's logic N4 is obtained by deleting the "explosive" axiom ∼ p → (p → q) from the axiomatics of N3. From the early 1970s several versions of N4 were studied independently by R. Routley (later R. Sylvan) in the propositional case in [28] , by López-Escobar in [18] and by Nelson himself in [1] , both in the first-order case. Algebraic semantics for N4 was suggested in [20] .
Kripke semantics for N3 ( [37, 14] ) is readily obtained from the usual Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic by assigning to each world, instead of a set of atoms, a set of literals, i.e. atoms or strongly negated atoms. Equivalently, the truth-assignment on atoms and worlds is 3-valued, to reflect the three cases of verified, falsified or neither. Changing to 4-valued assignments in Kripke models produces a semantics for N4: the fourth value now corresponds to "overdetermined" or the situation that both a literal and its contrary are verified at a world. This explains the choice of denotation N3 and N4. An alternative possible worlds semantics for constructive logic with strong negation was provided by Routley in [28] . The strong negation is interpreted in Routley frames via * -operator, which is typical for relevant logics. In this paper, we will consider Kripke frames augmented with the valuation of literals. This kind of semantics is obviously equivalent to the semantics with four-valued assignment and fits well to the constructions from [24] .
We will consider the paraconsistent Nelson's logic N4 and several extensions of the logic N4 ⊥ [21] . This is a version of paraconsistent Nelson's logic obtained from N4 by adding to the language the intuitionistic falsity constant ⊥ allowing to define the intuitionistic negation as ¬φ := φ → ⊥. The combination of paraconsistent negation ∼ and explosive negation ¬ in the logic N4 ⊥ is similar to the situation in logic programming, where logic programs with two kinds of negation are considered: the traditional for logic programming default negation (corresponding to the intuitionistic negation) and the explicit negation based on the idea similar to that of constructible falsity. In [23] , it was proved that the logic N 9 , a nine-valued N4 ⊥ -extension, serve as a deductive base for paraconsistent answer set semantics of logic programs with two kinds of negation. On the other hand, adding the constant ⊥ to the language of N4 results in a more regular structure of the class of N4 ⊥ -extensions. As it was shown in [21] , to clarify the general structure of the class EN4 ⊥ of N4 ⊥ -extensions it is essential to distinguishe in this class the subclasses Exp of explosive logics, Nor of normal logics, and Gen of logic in general form. In this paper, we consider the admissibility problem for the logics N3, N4 N , N4
• , and N4 ⊥ , which are the least logics of classes Exp, Nor, Exp ∩ Nor, and respectively Gen.
We cannot yet solve the general admissibility problem for Nelson's logics, but we can explicitly describe the strengthening of admissibility problem for positive and intuitionistic logics which is equivalent to the admissibility problem for Nelson's logics N4 and N4 ⊥ respectively. On this way we come to the notion of dependent admissibility, which assumes the connections between variables in the premiss and conclusion of the rule. The connected variables must be replaced by formulas the structures of which are agreed in one or another way. In the version of dependent admissibility equivalent to the admissibility problem in Nelson's logics we have to divide all variables into ordered pairs, and replaced each pair of connected variables by a formula and its dual.
The main feature of Kripke semantics of Nelson's logic is the independence of interpretation of literals p and ∼ p. Interpretations p and ∼ p are completely independent in case of the logics N4 and N4 ⊥ , if we pass to extensions of these logics, some restriction on this pair of interpretations must be imposed. For example, V (p) and V (∼ p) have empty intersection in case of N3, or V (p) ∪ V (∼ p) is dense in the algebra of cones of a Kripke frame in case of N4 ⊥ . These observations lead to the notion of weak admissibility, according to which we replace positive and negative occurrences of a variable via different formulas. This pair of formulas is arbitrary in case of N4 and N4 ⊥ and satisfies some restrictions for proper N4 ⊥ -extensions. For example, elements of such pair must be consistent in case of N3. We formulate the weak admissibility problem for all mentioned logic and show that for the logics N4 and N4 ⊥ this problem is equivalent to the admissibility problem for logic Int + and Int respectively. In this way the fact that the weak admissibility problem for N4 and N4
⊥ is decidable follows from the results of [24] .
In case of logics N3, N4 N , and N4
• there is no simple reduction to earlier obtained results, and we have to adapt the construction from [24] to prove that the weak admissibility problem for these logics is decidable.
Nelson's logics
Fix a countable set of propositional variables P rop = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , . . .} and an additional set of propositional variables P rop
By a propositional language we mean a finite set of connectives with indicated arities. The set of formulas of a propositional language L is obtained in a usual way from variables of P rop with the help of connectives of L. In some specially designated cases we will consider also an extended set of formulas defined over the extended set of variables P rop ∪ P rop † . By a logic in a propositional language L with →, ∈ L we mean a set of formulas closed under the rules of substitution and modus ponens. In this case we can define positive (intuitionistic) logic IPC + as the least logic in the language L + = ⟨∨, ∧, →⟩ containing the following axioms: In what follows we use the abbreviation φ ↔ ψ :
Paraconsistent Nelson's logic N4 is the least logic in the language L ∼ = ⟨∨, ∧, →, ∼⟩, where ∼ is a symbol for the strong negation connective, containing axioms of positive logic and the following axioms for the strong negation:
is the least logic in the language L ∼ containing axioms of the logic N4 and the Duns Scottus law for strong negation:
The logic N4 ⊥ is defined in the language L * = L ∼ ∪ {⊥} via axioms of N4 and the following axioms for the absurdity constant:
Due to this reason we can consider N3 as a logic in the language L * extending N4 ⊥ . Two other important extensions of the logic N4 ⊥ are defined as follows:
For a set S ⊆ P rop, we denote by F m
. For a set F of formulas, we put ∼ F = {∼ φ | φ ∈ F }. We denote by Lit(S) the set of literals from variables of S, Lit(S) = S∪ ∼ S. We write Lit instead of Lit(P rop). Put P n = {p 1 , . . . , p n } and Lit n = Lit(P n ).
Recall that IPC + coincides with the positive fragment of logics IPC, N3, and N4, i.e.,
At the same time, IPC is the ∼-free fragment of N4 ⊥ , IPC = N4 ⊥ ∩ F m ⊥ . A Kripke style semantics for Nelson's logic can be defined in a similar way to that for intuitionistic logic with the exception that valuations are defined on sets of literals.
A frame is a pair W = ⟨W, ≤⟩, where W is a non-empty set (of possible worlds), ≤ is a partial order on W . A subset R of W is called a cone of W (cone w.r.t. ≤) if it is upward closed w.r.t. ≤, i.e., for every x ∈ R and y ∈ W , if x ≤ y, then y ∈ R. We say that the cone R is sharp if there is an element a ∈ W such that R = {b ∈ W | a ≤ b}. In this case we will use the denotation R = [a] and ⟨a⟩ = [a] \ {a}. For a subset U of W , we denote
W such that S is some set of propositional variables and V (p) and V (∼ p) are cones w.r.t. ≤ for all p ∈ S. In this case we say that M is a model over W. We say that M is an N3-model if additionally
• -model if it is simultaneously an N4 N -model. The validity of formulas from F m * (S) at worlds of the model M is defined by induction. For p ∈ S, φ, ψ ∈ F m * (S) and x ∈ W we put:
If M, x φ and x ≤ y, then M, y φ. If M is an N3-model, then for every formula φ and worlds x we have M,
The semantics presented above is different from a more traditional approach (see, eg., [40] ), which assumes the presence of two valuations V + : S → 2 W and V − : S → 2 W and two forcing relations |= + and |= − between worlds and formulas. The second relation is defined for variables as follows:
The inductive steps for |= − -definition repeat steps for strongly negated formulas in the above definition. The equivalence of two kinds of semantics is more or less obvious.
We often consider different models over the same frame W = ⟨W, ≤⟩, therefore, it will be convenient to write W,
We will use also shorter denotation x V φ if it does not lead to a confusion.
If we have two models M 1 = ⟨W, V 1 ⟩ and M 2 = ⟨W, V 2 ⟩ over the same frame, we say that M 1 and M 2 (V 1 and
It is known that for every formula φ and
. In what follows we assume an agreement that if a model is denoted by a calligraphic latter, its set of worlds is denoted by the same italic letter,
It is known that N4 and N4 ⊥ are strongly complete w.r.t. the class of all frames and complete w.r.t. the class of all finite frames. The logic N3 is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of all N3-models and complete w.r.t. the class of all finite N3-models. In [17] , it was proved that the logic N4 N (N4 • ) is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of all N4 N -models (N4 • -models) and complete w.r.t. the class of all finite N4 N -models (N4
W is finite, then every world of this model lies under some maximal world. Clearly, for finite models the defining condition of N4 N -models can be replaced by the following: every maximal world x ∈ W belongs to V (p)∪V (∼ p) for all p ∈ S. In other worlds,
The latter condition is equivalent to
Thus, finite N4 N -models are N4-models, where all maximal worlds are complete w.r.t. ∼. We know that N3-models are N4-models, where all worlds are consistent w.r.t. ∼. Consequently, finite N4
• -models are exactly finite N3-models, where all maximal worlds are classical, i.e. consistent and complete w.r.t. ∼.
is the set of literals valid at the world x of the model M. In denotation Lit M (x) we omit the lower index, if it is clear from the context, which model we mean.
We will need a small refinement of the finite model property for Nelson's logics. Assume that an
Lit(S). It is easy to see that in this case
The set of all elements with this property form a cone w.r.t. ≤ which we denote All. Let us delete this cone from M, that is we pass from M to the new model
An easy induction on the complexity of formulas shows that
for all x ̸ ∈ All and φ ∈ F m * (S). For x, y ∈ M , the world y is said to be a duplication of x if x is the only immediate successor of y w.r.t. ≤ and Lit M (x) = Lit M (y). We say that an N4-model M has no duplications if there is no y ∈ M which is a duplication of another element of M . We say that x and y are twins, if they are incomparable, have the same successors w.r.t. ≤, and
If y is a duplication of x, or x and y are twins, it follows by an easy induction on the length of formulas that for all φ we have x V φ iff y V φ. Obviously, any filtration of an N4-model has no duplications and twins. Therefore, we may conclude that every formula φ ̸ ∈ N4 (φ ̸ ∈ N4 ⊥ ) is refuted on a finite N4-model M which has no duplications and twins, and has no world x such that M, x ⊢ Lit(S). In a similar way, every formula φ ̸ ∈ N3 (N4 N , N4
• ) is refuted on a finite N3-(N4 N -, N4 • -)model with the same properties.
Concluding the section we discuss normal forms of formulas with strong negation and embeddings of Nelson's logics into positive and intuitionistic logics.
We say that φ ∈ F m ∼ (S) (φ ∈ F m * (S)) is a negative normal form (nnf) if the strong negation connective occur in φ only in front of atomic formulas. Since the logics N4 and N4
⊥ contain all axioms of IPC + one can prove that these logic are closed under the positive replacement rule:
,
However, these logics are not closed under the usual replacement rule. Indeed, we have
The left side of this equivalence is equivalent to p → q by axiom (4 ∼ ), the right side is equivalent to ∼ p ∨ q by (2 ∼ ), (4 ∼ ), and the positive replacement rule. Thus, (p → q) ↔ (∼ p ∨ q) ∈ N4. This fact obviously contradicts to semantical characterization of N4.
The fact that Nelson's logics are closed under the positive replacement rules and the strong negation axioms allow us to prove that every formula can be reduced to a negative normal form. More precisely, let L ∈ {N3, N4, N4 ⊥ }. For every formula φ, there is a nnf ψ such that
In what follows we assume that we have fixed an algorithm assigning to a formula φ its negative normal form
where
We have just defined embeddings of Nelson's logic into positive intuitionistic and intuitionistic logics.
Theorem 2.1. 1. For every φ ∈ F m ∼ , the following equivalence holds:
For every φ ∈ F m
∼ , the following equivalences hold:
The statement for N3 was originally proved by Vorob'ev [38] .
n-Characterizing models for Nelson's logics
The semantics of Nelson's logics treats the literals ∼ p in the same way as propositional variables. Due to this reason the construction of ncharacterizing model for N4 (N4 ⊥ ) is very similar to the construction of 2n-characterizing model for IPC + (IPC) from [24] . To avoid confusions we provide however the construction with all details.
For an
. Now we construct an n-characterizing model for the logic N4 as a join of an ascending chain of N4-models
We start with a model
is an antichain, and the valuation V 1 is chosen so that
Assume that the model N k = ⟨N k , ≤ k , V k ⟩ has been constructed and define N k+1 . Let AC k be the set of all antichains of the model N k which contain at least one element of depth k. For each ∆ ∈ AC k , we consider new elements ∆ j and sets Lit(∆ j ) ⊆ Lit n indexed by elements of such a set X
Define the relation ≤ k+1 on N k+1 by putting
Obviously, we have defined a partial ordering N k+1 . Finally, we define the valuation:
where α ∈ Lit n . It is easy to see that V k+1 (α) is a cone w.r.t. ≤ k+1 . Thus, the N4-model
Proposition 3.1. The model N (n) is n-characterizing for the logics N4 and
, then there exists a finite N4-model M refuting φ, which has no duplications and twins, and has no worlds x such that M, x Lit n . Due to this reason for every maximal element x of M one can find a maximal element y of N (n) such that Lit M (x) = Lit N (n) (y). Identifying maximal elements of M with respective maximal elements of N (n) we obtain the model M 1 , i.e., we replace the maximal elements from M by respective maximal elements of N (n). Thus, S 1 (M 1 ) is a cone of N (n). Assume that we have already constructed a model M k such that S k (M k ) is a cone of N (n), the depth of M k is not greater then the depth of M, and M k φ. Let us construct a model M k+1 with similar properties.
Since M has no duplications, for every element
Since M has no twins, there is only one element x ∈ Sl k+1 (M k ) satisfying (1), and we identify this element with the element a of N (n). In this way we obtain the model M k+1 . It is not hard to see that M k+1 φ. Clearly, S k+1 (M k+1 ) is a cone of N (n), and the depth of M k+1 is equal to the depth of M k . Since M is finite, after a finite number of steps we obtain a model M m such that it is a cone of N (n) and M m φ. Consequently, N (n) φ.
To prove that N (n) is n-characterizing for N4 ⊥ let us take a formula
⊥ . This formula is refutable on a finite N4-model M, which has no duplications and twins, and has no worlds x such that M, x Lit n . We just proved that every such model can be embedded into N (n) as a cone. Consequently, φ is refutable on N (n) too.
Proposition 3.2. Every sharp cone of the model
Proof. We construct defining formulas for sharp cones [x] using induction on the depth of x.
For x ∈ S 1 (N (n)), put
Assume that for every x ∈ S m (N (n)) we have constructed the formula f (x) that distinguishes the sharp cone [x] from other elements of N (n). For all x ∈ Sl m+1 (N (n)), define
It is clear that for every y ∈ S m+1 (N (n)), we have
Further, we let
Consider some a ∈ Sl m+1 (N (n)) and prove that f (a) is the desired formula, i.e., that f (a) defines [a] . It is easy to see that N (n), a f (a).
Assume now that r ∈ S m+2+k (N (n)) and N (n), r f (a). By It remains to construct an n-characteristic models N 3 (n), N N (n), and N • (n) for the logics N3, N4 N , and respectively N4
• . We define them as a generated submodels of N (n) with the following set of worlds:
In other worlds, the model N 3 (n) consists of those worlds of N (n), which are consistent and have only consistent extensions; the model N N (n) consists of worlds with complete maximal extensions. Finally, N
• (n) consists of consistent worlds with classical maximal extensions.
Proof. It is obvious that
To complete the proof let us take a formula φ ∈ F m * (P n ) such that φ ̸ ∈ N3. This formula is refutable on a finite N3-model M, which has no duplications and twins, and has no worlds x such that M, x Lit n . It is also an N4-model and we know that M can be embedded into N (n) as a cone. Since all worlds of the N3-model M are consistent, its image is contained in N 3 (n). Thus, M can be considered as a generated submodel of N 3 (n), and we may conclude that φ is refutable on N 3 (n), i.e., N 3 (n) is n-characterizing for N3.
To prove that N N (n) is n-characterizing for N4 N we have to embed an arbitrary finite N4 N -model M as cone into N N (n). Let us consider the image of M in N (n). We know that all maximal worlds of M are complete. It is obvious that the images of maximal complete worlds are maximal and complete as well. Thus, the image of M is a subset of N4 N . For N • (n), the proof follows the same line.
All sharp cones of N 3 (n), N N (n), and N • (n) are P n -definable, because they are cones of N (n).
Admissibility and weak admissibility of inference rules in
N4 and N4
⊥
We recall that a rule of inference with parameters is an expression r of the form
where φ i and ψ are formulas,x andp are tuples of propositional variables,x are variables of r andp are parameters of r. The rule r is said to be admissible in a logic L extending N4 or N4 ⊥ if for every tuple of formulasξ in the respective language, we have
Obviously, the rule r is admissible in L iff the rule
is admissible in L. Therefore, in what follows we consider only rules with one premiss. Further, since every formula is equivalent in L to its negative normal form, the rule
is admissible in L. So, studying the admissibility problem in extensions of Nelson's logics it will be sufficient to consider rules of the form
where φ, ψ ∈ F m + if we consider N4-extensions, and φ, ψ ∈ F m ⊥ in case of N4 ⊥ -extensions. First we notice that the admissibility problem for the logics N4 and N4 ⊥ is equivalent to the following strengthening of admissibility problem for IPC + and respectively IPC considered over the extended set of propositional variables P rop ∪ P rop † . For φ ∈ F m ⊥ (P rop ∪ P rop † ), we define its dual formula φ d as follows:
Letx andȳ denote disjoint tuples of propositional variables of the same length. For φ(x,ȳ,p), ψ(x,ȳ,p)
Hereξ d denote a tuple of formulas dual to formulas fromξ. 
Proposition 4.1. Let φ(x,ȳ,p,q), ψ(x,ȳ,p,q)
∈ F m + (P rop) (F m ⊥ (P rop)θ ∈ F m + (P rop ∪ P rop † ), we have (∼ θ ′ ) 4 = θ d .
From this fact and the definition of translation (·)
4 we obtain
N4. We have thus proved that the rule φ(x,∼x,p,∼p) ψ(x,∼x,p,∼p) is not admissible in N4.
The admissibility problem for the logics N4 and N4 ⊥ is reduced in this way to d-admissibilty problem for positive and intuitionistic logics. We are not ready to solve either of these problems, but in view of the fact that literals p i and ∼ p i are interpreted independently in N4-models there is a sense to consider a weak form of admissibility, which assumes that literals p and ∼ p are replaced not by formulas ξ and ∼ ξ, but by arbitrary formulas ξ and ζ. We say that an inference rule
is weakly admissible in N4 (N4 ⊥ ) if for every tuples of formulasξ andζ of the same length asx, we have ψ(ξ,ζ,p, ∼p) ∈ N4 (N4 ⊥ ), whenever
The weak admissibility problem for N4 (N4 ⊥ ) is equivalent to admissibility problem for positive intuitionistic logic (intuitionistic logic). φ(x,ȳ,p,q), ψ(x,ȳ,p,q From this proposition and the facts that the problems of admissibility of rules with parameters for positive logic IPC + [24] and for intuitionistic logic IPC [31] are algorithmically decidable we obtain the following
Proposition 4.2. Let

Corollary 4.3. The problems of weak admissibility of rules with parameters for Nelson's logics N4 and N4
⊥ are algorithmically decidable.
Weak admissibility of rules in N3, N4
N , and N4
•
Earlier we have defined the notion of weak admissibility specially for the logics N4 and N4 ⊥ , because this notion reflects a unique semantic feature of these logics: the interpretations of literals V (p) and V (∼ p) are completely independent one from the other. Passing from N4 and N4 ⊥ to their extensions will impose restrictions on the interrelations between V (p) and V (∼ p), so the adequate notion of weak admissibility for these logics must reflect these restrictions. In this section we define and investigate the notion of weak admissibility for the logics N3, N4 N , and N4
• . The class of N3-models is distinguished in the class of all N4-models by the requirement V (p) ∩ V (∼ p) = ∅, which reflects the fact that ¬(p∧ ∼ p) ∈ N3. Recall that here the symbol ¬ denotes the intuitionistic negation definable in N3 as ¬φ := φ → ⊥. This restriction has the following natural syntactical correspondence: instead of p and ∼ p we have to substitute a pair of inconsistent formulas ξ and ζ, i.e. ¬(ξ ∧ ζ) ∈ N3. These considerations lead to the following definition.
Let φ(x,ȳ,p,q), ψ(x,ȳ,p,q) ∈ F m ⊥ (P rop). We say that the inference rule φ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p) ψ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p) with parameters is weakly admissible in N3 if for every tuples of formulas ξ andζ of the same length asx and such that ¬(ξ ∧ζ) ∈ N3, we have ψ(ξ,ζ,p, ∼p) ∈ N3, whenever φ(ξ,ζ,p, ∼p) ∈ N3. Naturally, the denotation ¬(ξ ∧ζ) ∈ N3 means that ¬(ξ i ∧ ζ i ) ∈ N3 for all respective components ξ i and ζ i of tuplesξ andζ.
The class of N4 N -models is distinguished in the class of all N4-models by the requirement that (V (p) ∪ V (∼ p)) ↓ coincides with the set of all worlds, which corresponds to ¬¬(p∨ ∼ p) ∈ N4
N . In case of finite models this requirement can be replaced by the following: all maximal worlds are in V (p) ∪ V (∼ p). The class of N4
• -models is the intersection of classes of N3-and N4 N -models. Naturally, we define the weak admissibility of rules for these logics as follows.
We say that the inference rule
with parameters is weakly admissible in N4 N (N4 • ) if for every tuples of formulasξ andζ of the same length asx and such that ¬¬(ξ ∨ζ) ∈ N4
Unfortunately, we do not see a possibility to reduce the weak admissibility problem for N3, N4 N , and N4
• to the solved admissibility problem for intuitionistic logic in a way similar to that for paraconsistent versions of Nelson logic. Due to this reason we adapt a technique from [24] .
For a rule r = φ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p)/ψ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p), denote by Sub(r) the set Sub({φ, ψ}), by V P (r) the set of all variables and parameters and by P (r) the set of all parameters of the rule r. We put Lit(r) = V P (r)∪ ∼ V P (r) and LitP (r) = P (r)∪ ∼ P (r).
For every subset M ⊆ 2 Sub(r) , we define an
It is clear that M is an N3-model iff all X ∈ M are consistent w.r.t. literals, i.e. there are no p i and X ∈ M such
, where P n contains all P (r), and a definable N3-(N4 N -, N4
• -)valuation V 1 coinciding with the original valuation of
, where φ is true w.r.t. V 1 at all worlds from N (n), but ψ is false w.r.t. V 1 at some world. = φ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p)/ψ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p) be an inference rule with parameters and let n be such that P (r) ⊂ P n . Suppose that, for an arbitrary N3-(N4
Proposition 5.1. Let r
• -)model M = ⟨M, ⊆, V ⟩ has the following properties:
Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary N3-valuation V 1 in N 3 (n) for all letters from r, which agrees with the original valuation V (n) on LitP (r), where
For every a ∈ N 3 (n), we put
The set M is defined as {t(a) | a ∈ N 3 (n)}. Since V 1 is an N3-valuation, the respective M is an N3-model. We prove that M satisfies all the required properties.
We, first, proof the property (a) by induction on the length of the formula ξ. For elements of Lit(r) the desired equivalence holds by definition of the valuation V in the model M. Consider the case of complex formulas. Let M, X ξ ∧ ζ. Then M, X ξ and M, X ζ, and we have by induction hypothesis ξ ∈ X and ζ ∈ X. By definition of M there is a ∈ N 3 (n) such that X = t(a), and we have a V1 ξ and a V1 ζ. Consequently, a V1 ξ ∧ ζ, i.e., ξ ∧ ζ ∈ X. On the other hand, if ξ ∧ ζ ∈ X and X = t(a), then a V1 ξ and a V1 ζ. Therefore, ξ ∈ X and ζ ∈ X. By the induction hypothesis we have M, X ξ and M, X ζ, which implies M, X ξ ∧ ζ.
The case of disjunction can be treated in a similar way. Since φ and ψ are nnf, we do not need to consider the cases of negated formulas. So it remains only to consider the case of implication.
The property (a) is thus proved.
We proceed to the proof of the property (b). Assume that ∇ = ∅. By construction of the n-characterizing model N 3 (n), for every consistent
By the construction of the model The next theorem plays the central part for deciding admissibility.
Theorem 5.2. If r = φ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p)/ψ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p) is an inference rule with parameters and there exists
• -)model and has properties (a)-(c) from Proposition 5.1, then for some n, where P (r) ⊂ P n , there exist formulasξ andζ in propositional letters from P n such that
• and ¬(ξ ∧ζ) ∈ N4 • ) and
Moreover, formulasξ andζ can be constructed effectively in M.
Proof. First we consider the logic N3. Let M ⊆ 2 Sub(r) be such that M = ⟨M, ⊆, V ⟩ is an N3-model and has properties (a)-(c) from Proposition 5.1.
Take the model N 3 (n), where n = ||M ||+||LitP (r)||. We assume any X from M to be associated with the letter p X from Dom(V (n) ), and P (r) just to be letters from Dom(V (n) ) of N 3 (n). Let us extend the valuation V of the model M to all variables p X , X ∈ M , by putting V (p X ) := {Y ∈ M | Y X} and V (∼ p X ) := ∅. Since V (∼ p X ) := ∅ it will be again an N3-valuation. In what follows M denotes a model with the extended valuation, in particular, atoms of the form p X are true or false at worlds of M and a literals ∼ p X are false at worlds of M.
Our goal is to construct a definable N3-valuation V 1 of N 3 (n) such that V 1 agrees with V (n) on LitP (r) and satisfies:
To this end we construct an ascending sequence of N3-models e k (M), k ∈ ω (which are based at cones of N 3 (n)) with definable in N 3 (n) valuations, which agree with V (n) on LitP (r). Moreover, for every k ∈ ω, it will be
where any e k (Y ) is a definable cone of N 3 (n). Finally, we will need that for every k ≥ 0 the following conditions are satisfied. (p1) e k−1 (X) ⊆ e k (X) for all X ∈ M . Here we assume e −1 (X) = ∅ and
, and
(p4) The valuation V k of e k (M) is defined on Lit(r). It agrees with V (n) on LitP (r), whereas for literals α of the form z or ∼ z, where z is variable letter of r, we have
V k coincides with any V j on e j (M) for j < k. In this way, e j (M) is a generated submodel of e k (M). We know from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that every finite N3-model with the above listed properties can be embedded into N 3 (n) as a generated submodel. Let e be an embedding of M into N 3 (n). In this case, e(M) is a cone of N 3 (n), besides, by (a) from Proposition 5.1,
2) Now we will extend the model e(M) to a model e 0 (M) containing all worlds of the model N 3 (n) with depth 1. Note that since M is a finite object and N 3 (n) is effectively constructed, the construction of e(M) is also effective, and by c ∈ S 1 (N 3 (n)) we can effectively decide, whether c ∈ e(M).
We can effectively find one of such elements. Denote it by X 0 (c, 0). For every Y ∈ M , we put
Since X 0 (c, 0) can be effectively found by c, we can effectively compute
be the set of worlds of e 0 (M). We introduce the following valuation V 0 in e 0 (M) defined on Lit(r): it agrees with V (n) on LitP (r), whereas for α = x j or α =∼ x j , x j ∈x, we put
Clearly, the cone V 0 (α) can be effectively determined by α. By Proposition 3.2 every sharp cone of N 3 (n) is P n -definable, every V 0 (α) is a finite union of sharp cones, therefore, it is also P n -definable. We obtain that the valuation V 0 is definable in N 3 (n). Moreover, defining formulas for V 0 (α) can be constructed effectively, because the cones V 0 (α) are constructed effectively. For any Y ∈ M, the cone e 0 (X) is definable in N 3 (n), and again we can effectively construct the formulas s 0 (Y ) defining cones e 0 (Y ). In every world of e 0 (M), the validity of literals is defined in the same way as in one of worlds of M. Since M is an N3-model, e 0 (M) also is an N3-model.
We have thus constructed the N3-model e 0 (M) with a definable in N 3 (n) valuation. Conditions (p1), (p3), and (p4) are satisfied for this model in an obvious way.
The sets X 0 (c, 0) were defined for all c ∈ S 1 (N 3 (n))\e(M), and for such c, we set X(c, 0) := X 0 (c, 0). 
(for s −1 (Z) we put ⊥). It is clear that χ ∇ min is valid at the world x of N 3 (n) iff all atoms from b ∇ are valid at x and the validity of some atom from LitP (r) \ b at y ≥ x implies y ∈ e k (M). The validity of ψ
∈ ∇, we define the formula ψ ∇ as above and put:
For any Y ∈ M we set 
and c 1 ∈ e k+1 (X ∇,bc 1 ), where
For (p4):
We define the valuation V k+1 as follows. For elements of LitP (r) it coincides with V (n) and for literals α of the form z and ∼ z, where z is a variable of r, we set
From the definition of sets e k+1 (Y ), Y ∈ M , it follows that the valuation V k+1 is definable, extends V k and coincides with V (n) on LitP (r). We need to show that V k+1 coincides with V l for l ≤ k on e l (M).
Let b ∈ e l (Y ) and b V l α, then b ∈ e l−j (Y 1 ) and α ∈ Y 1 . Then b ∈ e k+1 (Y 1 ) and b V k+1 α. Conversely, let b ∈ e l (Y ) \ e l−1 (M) and b V k+1 α (the case of other l may evidently be reduced to this one by IH for (p4)).
For (p5):
We need to show ∀a ∈ e k+1 (M) \ e k (M),
If a ∈ e k+1 (Y ) \ e k (M), by (p2) for (k+1) and Proposition 5.4, we have a ∈ e k+1 (X(a, k + 1)), where, for
Therefore by definition of V k+1 (5.4) holds for every literal φ ∈ Sub(r). We continue our proof by induction on the length of φ. Inductive steps for ∧ and ∨ are evident, we do now →.
Therefore we obtain X(c, j) ∈ ∇ and because β 1 → β 2 ∈ X(a, j + 1) we also have β 1 → β 2 ∈ X(c, j) (cf. description of X(a, k + 1) above). Therefore by IH for (p5) we obtain: c Vj β 1 → β 2 and consequently c V k+1 β 1 → β 2 .
Assume now that a ≤ c and c / ∈ e k (M). Then c ∈ e k+1 (X(c, k + 1)) \ e k (M) by Proposition 5. Then it could be two options for c: (a1) c ∈ e k+1 (X min ∇,b∇ ) \ e k (M) or (a2) c ∈ e k+1 (X(a, k + 1)).
In case (a1) reasoning as above we conclude c V k+1 β 1 → β 2 . In case (a2), if c ≤ c 1 ̸ ∈ e k (M), then either c 1 ∈ e k+1 (X min ∇,b∇ )\e k (M), and reasoning as above we obtain c 1 V k+1 β 1 → β 2 . Or c 1 ∈ e k+1 (X(a, k+1) ), and applying IH we again conclude c 1 V k+1 β 1 → β 2 . In total, we proved, a V k+1 β 1 → β 2 . By (p3) our procedure terminates at a step k, where k ≤ m and m is the number of worlds in M , and we get e k (M) = N 3 (n). More exactly, we may stop at the first k such that ∨ X∈M s k (X) ∈ N3. Due to (p5) we have V k (φ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p)) = N 3 (n) and V k (ψ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p)) ̸ = N 3 (n). We know that V k agrees with V (n) onp and ∼p and that the cones V k (x j ) and V k (∼ x j ), x j ∈x, are definable in N 3 (n) by formulas, say,ξ andζ, i.e., V k (x j ) = V (n) (ξ j ) and V k (∼ x j ) = V (n) (ζ j ), x j ∈x. In this way,
Direction: ⇒
and V (n) (ψ(ξ,ζ,p, ∼p)) = V k (ψ(x, ∼x,p, ∼p)) ̸ = N 3 (n).
It remain to notice that ¬(ξ ∧ζ) ∈ N3. Assume that V k is not an N3-valuation, i.e. that x V k p∧ ∼ p for some x and p. Then y V k p∧ ∼ p for some maximal world y over x. All maximal worlds of N 3 belong to e 0 (M), consequently by (p4) we have y V0 p∧ ∼ p. The latter is impossible, because we know that V 0 is an N3-valuation. We have thus proved that V k is an N3-valuation. Consequently, V (n) (ξ j ) ∩ V (n) (ζ j ) = ∅, i.e. V (n) (ξ j ∧ ζ j ) = ∅, whence V (n) (¬(ξ j ∧ ζ j )) = N 3 (n). The latter means that ¬(ξ j ∧ ζ j ) ∈ N3 for all x j ∈x.
Assume now that we start from an N4 N -model M. We argue as above with the following two exceptions. First, we change the definition of the valuation V on literal ∼ p X . For a maximal world x, the literal ∼ p X is true at x iff p X is false at x. If x is not maximal, then ∼ p x is false at x. Second, we have to notice that defining model e 0 (M) for every c ∈ S 1 (N N ) \ e(M) we can choose a world X 0 (c, 0) maximal in M (see the proof of Proposition 5.1). All maximal worlds of M are complete, because this is an N4 N -model. Consequently all maximal worlds of e 0 (M) and of every e j (M) are complete too. As a result we obtain an N4 N -valuation V 1 . This means that V (n) (ξ j ∨ ζ j ) contains all maximal worlds of N N (n), i.e. ¬¬(ξ j ∨ ζ j ) ∈ N4 N . Suppose that now it is clear how to treat an N4
• -model M. AAAAAA These remarks complete the proof of our Theorem 5.2. Recall that a rule r is said to be true on a frame w.r.t. a valuation V , if the conclusion of this rule is true w.r.t. V at all worlds from this frame, when this holds for all formulas of the premise of r. 
